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Ethanol is an alluring political solution for problems ranging from global warming and 
national energy security to local economic development. Ethanol burns cleaner than gasoline, is 
derived from renewable agricultural products, and creates local jobs and income. For farmers, 
ethanol offers a classic value-added strategy, and stories abound of farmers who joined together, 
started an ethanol plant, and made millions more by processing their corn into ethanol instead of 
selling it on the commodity market. For community leaders, there is the siren song of press releases 
touting the 120 jobs and $145 million to result from the latest plant announced elsewhere. 
Contributing to the frenzy of local interest is the pressure to act before the neighbors do because 
agricultural supply constraints limit the number of plants the immediate region can support. The 
pace is rapid. As of August 1, 2007, the Renewable Fuels Association listed 124 ethanol 
biorefineries with 76 more under construction. Those 76 new ones will double the national capacity 
to 12.8 billion gallons per year (http://www.ethanolrfa.org/).   
 
This chapter answers three important questions: Where have ethanol plants been locating, 
what factors make a location attractive for an ethanol plant, and what are typical plants’ local 
economic effects? Thus, this chapter is useful for people interested in ethanol and local economic 
development who want to know (1) what has been happening and why, (2) whether their county is a 
prospective ethanol plant location, and (3) what would happen in their local economy if a plant 
located there.  
 
Like many investment booms that promise high returns, the ethanol strategy has risks and 
uncertainty. Questions abound regarding the long-term viability of corn as the feedstock for ethanol, 
the profitability of ethanol production, its resource use, particularly water and energy, and its net 
effects on the environment. An umbrella of government policy, including ethanol subsidies, 
required ethanol content, commodity support payments, and ethanol tariffs, covers the industry and 
plays strategic roles in its future.  
 
The Ethanol Industry: An Overview 
 
Policy Drivers of Ethanol Industry Growth 
 
Energy security, global warming, and federal tax credits define much of the policy umbrella 
promoting recent growth in the ethanol industry, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 9. Oil 
imports represented 38 percent of the 2006 U.S. trade deficit (Cavallo 2006), and the domestic 
production of a substitute decreases the trade deficit and dependence on oil exporting countries. In 
his State of the Union Address in January 2007, President Bush set a national goal of reducing U.S. 
gasoline consumption by 20 percent over the next ten years, in part by reducing oil imports and 
using more renewable fuels like ethanol (White House 2007).The Energy Policy Act of 2005 
amended the Clean Air Act to create a national Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS). The RFS program 
requires that 7.5 billion gallons of renewable fuels be used in the motor fuel supply by 2012, almost 
doubling the 4 billion used in 2006, the majority of which was ethanol. That goal is likely to be met   3
by 2008 or 2009. The Environmental Protection Agency, which administers the program, now notes 
that 11 billion gallons are projected by 2012. 
 
Environmental policy is a major driver of the ethanol industry. Use of a 10 percent ethanol 
blend reduces greenhouse gas emissions by 18 to 29 percent over conventional gasoline, and in 
2006 ethanol use reduced auto emissions equivalent to removing 1.21 million cars from U.S. roads, 
according to Argonne National Laboratory (Wu 2007). Demand for ethanol derives in part from the 
federal mandate that an oxygenate be used to meet requirements of the Clean Air Act and from state 
government rules that require the use of ethanol blends. A far reaching, recent example of the latter 
occurred in June 2007 when the California Air Resources Board changed the rules under which 
refineries formulate gasoline for sale in California, noting “The greater use of ethanol in the 
formulas will also reduce global warming emissions.” California, which uses more ethanol than any 
other state, anticipates its policy action will triple the size of the state’s renewable fuels market by 
2020 (www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/nr061507.htm). Similarly, California and about 20 other states have 
banned methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE), an oxygenate that contaminates drinking water, leaving 
ethanol as their only alternative. The federal EPA considered a nationwide ban, but the Bush 
administration withdrew the proposal, leaving the matter to Congress, which has considered but not 
passed provisions to phase-out MTBE. The situation remains fluid, but the strong regulatory role 
and potential of state governments in driving ethanol demand are now well established. 
 
A federal tax credit also increases ethanol production. The Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax 
Credit, part of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, provides ethanol blenders with 51 cents per 
pure gallon of ethanol blended or 0.51 cents per percentage point of ethanol blended. Thus, the 
common 10 percent ethanol blend qualifies for 5.1 cents per gallon and the 85 percent blend, E85, 
qualifies for 43.35 cents per gallon. The incentive is available until 2010 and comes out of the U.S. 
Treasury’s General Fund (U.S. Department of Energy 2007). There is also a tax credit for small 
ethanol plants that produce no more than 60 million gallons of ethanol per year. As of March 2006, 
15 states had producer incentive programs, 11 had retailer incentives for ethanol blends and E85, 
and 5 had their own renewable fuel standards (www.ethanolrfa.org/policy/). Several of the producer 
credits were 20 cents per gallon, and two states reached 40 cents. 
 
Domestic ethanol production of ethanol is also protected by a 54-cent-per-gallon tariff on 
imported ethanol. In December 2006, Congress extended the tariff from October 2007 through 
January 1, 2009. Currently the tariff is aimed chiefly at Brazilian producers, who use sugar cane to 
make ethanol.   
 
Ethanol Plant Inputs and Outputs 
 
Under this policy umbrella and facilitated by technological improvements, a combination of 
high oil prices and low corn prices made ethanol an economically efficient way to provide 
renewable fuel for the first time (Doering 2006). Modern ethanol plants use a dry-mill technology 
that is much more efficient than the ethanol plants of 15 years ago and has allowed plant production 
capacity to soar. Plants producing 100 MGY (million gallons per year) are now common. As 
indicated in Chapter 4, modern ethanol plants are increasingly corporately owned, as opposed to 
farmer or cooperatively owned, and their main inputs are corn, natural gas, water, yeasts, chemicals, 
and enzymes, with labor a relatively minor input. Corn is generally purchased directly from   4
producers who may or may not have a contract with the ethanol plant. Most plants pay a small per 
bushel price premium, 5 to 10 cents per bushel is most common (Schill 2007), over local elevator 
prices to ensure year-round supply. This price premium suffices to compensate producers to truck 
corn no more than 35 to 50 miles to the ethanol plant (Stueffen 2005), so ethanol plants tend to 
locate close to an adequate corn supply. Noteworthy exceptions include the California ethanol 
plants that import corn from the Midwest. 
 
Both ethanol and its most important inputs are subject to volatile prices. Corn, natural gas, 
and electricity typically are more than half the cost of ethanol production. Whether a plant covers it 
costs in any given period depends on the relationships among corn and energy prices (Chapter 4). 
 
Ethanol, which is sold to blenders who combine it with gasoline for retail, represents 90 
percent of a typical plant’s revenue, with two by-products, distiller’s grains and carbon dioxide, also 
providing revenues (Stueffen 2005). Distiller’s grains are primarily fed to beef cattle, either wet to 
nearby herds or dried and sold commercially (Chapter 6). Some plants sell the carbon dioxide, but 
many have no market for the gas so they simply release it, which is the dominant practice in the 
Midwest (Pierce et al. 2006).  
 
Ethanol Industry Output Growth 
 
The ethanol industry in the U.S. has grown steadily from the cottage industry that produced 
175 million gallons in 1980 (Urbankchuk 2006). By 1990, 35 ethanol plants made 865 millions 
gallons (RFA 2006). The big take-off began after 2002 to reach a production capacity of 6.5 billion 
gallons in 124 plants by August 2007 (Figure 1), and now an additional 6.4 billion capacity is under 
construction (RFA 2007). 
 
Other countries are increasing ethanol production, too (RFA 2006a). Until recently Brazil, 
the lowest cost producer, was the world’s leader (Figure 2). According to de Moraes (2007), 
producing ethanol in Brazil from sugarcane costs half as much as producing it in the U.S. from 
corn. Despite the U.S. tax credits to induce domestic ethanol production, the 54 cent per gallon 
tariff, and a 2.5 percent ad valorem tax, the U.S. imports a small amount of ethanol from Brazil. 
Qualifying Caribbean countries can send ethanol to the U.S. tariff-free, and a small portion of U.S. 
ethanol consumption (six million gallons in 2005) comes from Jamaica and Costa Rica.   










































Figure 1. Ethanol Production Capacity in the U.S. 
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Figure 2. Top Five Ethanol Producing Countries and Production 
Data Source: Renewable Fuels Association, Industry Statistics 
Market Penetration 
 
The U.S. ethanol industry has its roots in the Midwest, particularly in states which were 
among the first to recognize the economic value ethanol production adds to locally produced crops. 
Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, and Nebraska are the top ethanol users when measured as a percentage of 
motor fuel consumption (Figure 3). Minnesota has the highest percentage, 10 percent, and Illinois 
has reached 7 percent (U.S. Dept. of Transportation).  
   6
California and Nevada had each reached 4 percent ethanol by 2003 (Figure 3). Los Angeles 
and Las Vegas are required by the Clean Air Act to use fuel additives to reduce carbon monoxide 
emissions. California’s percentage must have increased since 2003 because it discontinued use of 
methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE) on January 1, 2004, but no numbers seem to be available after 
the 2003 ones. 
 
Less than 2.5% (average)
2.5% – 5.0%
Greater than 5% (one standard deviation above average) 
 
Figure 3. Ethanol Use as Percent of Total Gasoline Consumption, 2003 
Data Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, 2003 
 
Consumption numbers even for 2003 suffice to demonstrate the importance of California as 
an ethanol market. California used over 20 percent of U.S. ethanol, while Illinois used 14 percent. 
Four states consumed over half the U.S. ethanol supply, and ten states consumed over three-quarters 
(Table 1). Absent from the list are several of the most populous states, Texas, New York, Florida, 
and Pennsylvania, suggesting that ethanol demand could grow considerably higher if policy 
mandates, such as the MTBE ban, become nationwide. 
 
Table 1. Top Ten States' Share of Consumption of U.S. Ethanol Supply, 2003 
State  Share 
California  21% 
Illinois  14% 
Minnesota  10% 
Ohio  7% 
Michigan  6% 
State  Share 
Indiana  5% 
Wisconsin  4% 
Iowa  4% 
Missouri  3% 
North Carolina  3% 
Data Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, 2003   7
Location and Employment of U.S. Ethanol Plants 
 
Employment Data by County and Establishment 
 
This study examines county-level ethanol industry employment using annual federal 
government statistics from the U.S. Bureau of the Census. To protect the confidentiality of business 
information, the Census Bureau suppresses employment and payroll data, although it provides 
establishment employment by size category, for example, 20-49 employees. The precise 
employment number can be estimated using an algorithm described in Isserman and Westervelt 
(2006), and we use those estimates here. The most recent data available are County Business 
Patterns (CBP) for the mid-March pay period of 2005, but the industry has continued to grow 
rapidly since then, so we supplement the 1998-2005 CBP data with plant location information from 
the Renewable Fuels Association.  
 
CBP data depend on establishments being designated correctly under the six-digit North 
American Industrial Classification System (NAICS). The modern dry-mill ethanol industry is part 
of NAICS code 325193, “non-potable ethyl alcohol (ethanol) production,” which includes some 
firms that do not interest us, such as small distilleries. Therefore, we investigated all suspicious 
observations, including those with fewer than 10 or more than 50 employees and those that did not 
appear consistently within the 1998-2005 data, and modified the 2004 CBP data.
2 Establishments 
found not to be ethanol plants, including a cheese factory and an organic chemistry laboratory, were 
deleted from the analysis. 
 
Employment Growth and Locations 
 
Total employment in the ethanol industry is growing. Employment increased by 50 percent 
between 2000 and 2005, and the number of ethanol plants doubled between 2000 and 2007, rising 
from 54 to 124 (Figure 4).  
                                                 
2 We sought each suspicious establishment on the internet, comparing the county of interest from CBP with lists of 
ethanol establishments from the Renewable Fuels Association and ethanol.org. When this step identified a firm’s name, 
we googled it. When no firm name was found, we googled the county name, ethanol, distill, and so on, until we found a 
firm. Firm websites usually give history including construction and beginning operation dates. One website stated the 
plant had been closed down. Local news articles also provided information about the type of establishment, estimated 
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Ethanol Plants (Rt. Axis)
Figure 4. Ethanol Plants and Total Employment 
Data Source: County Business Patterns (employment); Renewable Fuels Association (plants), as of August 2007. 
 
Over half the plants now have 20 to 49 employees (Figure 5). Ethanol plants are not large 
employers relative to their county’s economic base. Only one ethanol plant provides more than 2 
percent of its county’s jobs. In Calhoun, Arkansas, it employs 210 people, approximately 5 percent 










































Figure 5. Number of Plants by Employment Size 
Data Source: Renewable Fuels Association, Industry Statistics, County Business Patterns 
 
The clustering of ethanol plants in the nation’s corn-belt is evident, but there are exceptions 
in addition to the California plants (Figure 6). Many midsize plants (30-50 MGY) are in Minnesota, 
South Dakota, Iowa, and Nebraska. Nationally, the average plant capacity is 51 million gallons, and   9
the median is 42 million, but plants that began production between June 2006 and May 2007 are 


























































Figure 6. Ethanol Plants and Plants under Construction, August 2007  




Most ethanol plants are in rural America. Rural and mixed rural counties
3 contain 86 percent 
of ethanol plants, likely due to proximity to input suppliers (corn) and by-product users (livestock). 
Railroad access to the plant site is almost a necessity, as are adequate highways for truck 
transportation of inputs and distiller’s grains. Access to abundant water and power are also 
essential. According to Swenson and Eathington (2006), transporting corn to an ethanol plant is 
only cost-effective up to 50 miles within corn growing regions. Therefore, the largest plants are 
                                                 
3 Rural counties have either 90 percent of their population in rural areas or no urban area with a population of 10,000 or 
more. Mixed rural counties have a population density less than 320 people per square mile and an urban area with 
10,000 or more residents.  For a more complete discussion of these definitions and the distinctions among rural, mixed 
rural, mixed urban, and urban counties, see Isserman (2005).   10
adjacent to major grain distribution terminals. Nearby cattle feeding facilities can make the best use 
of distiller’s grains, the main by-product.  
 
Spatial Proximity to Inputs 
 
The optimal plant location is close to inputs, including corn or another feedstock, energy, 
and water, and important infrastructure, including railroad and highway transportation. Two-thirds 
of ethanol plants are in the Midwest, where corn is a predominant crop and supplying corn is 
relatively cheap and easy. The center of the Midwest cluster is in northwest Iowa.
4 Figure 7 shows 
ethanol plants and their location with regard to the percent of nearby land in corn production. 
Ethanol plants without a nearby supply must ship in feedstock, which is costly, but so is shipping 
ethanol to blenders. California ethanol plants do import corn, but they anticipate that more corn will 
be grown in the state and non-corn cellulosic ethanol will eventually become viable (San Francisco 
Chronicle, August 5, 2007).  
 
>28% (>2 std. dev above average) Land in Corn
7 % (average) to 28 % Land in Corn
Ethanol Plants, August 2007
 
Figure 7. Percent of Land in Corn Production and Plant Location  
Data Source: U.S. Census of Agriculture, Renewable Fuels Association 
 
                                                 
4 U.S. Census Bureau definition of Midwest, 2006 county ethanol plant data.   11
Spatial Proximity to Cattle 
 
In 2005, nine million metric tons of distiller’s dried grains with solubles (DDGS) were by-
products of ethanol production. Approximately 80 percent of the spent grain is dried and sold, 
generally out of the region (RFA 2006). If livestock are close enough to an ethanol plant (within 50 
miles), cattle can eat the spent grain wet, which is much cheaper. Beef cattle being finished can eat 
17 pounds per day of this wet material, so one 100 MGY plant can feed over 100,000 head to 
maturity twice per year (Pierce et al. 2006). Illinois counties have fewer than 25,000 head of beef 
cattle each, many less than the feeding capacity of an ethanol plant (Figure 8). Without the nearby 
cattle, ethanol plants face the cost of drying the distiller grains or transporting it by truck to end 
users or disposal. The cost of drying wet grain is high, but the wet distillers’ grains have only a five-
to-seven day shelf life and are expensive to transport due to the large volume. 
 
The Renewable Fuels Association has noted an increase in livestock production near ethanol 
plants, likely due to availability of the relatively inexpensive feed. This trend is also discussed in 
Chapter 6. Nationally, 54 percent of counties with an ethanol plant have an above average density 
of cattle on feed, and 87 percent of plants are within 50 miles of a county with an above average 
density, even when using data from the 2002 Census of Agriculture with current plant locations.  
 
Above average cattle on feed
Over 100,000 cattle on feed
Ethanol Plants, August 2007
Figure 8. Cattle on Feed by County and Location of Ethanol Plants 
Data Source: U.S. Census of Agriculture, Renewable Fuels Association   12
A commercial feed lot in eastern Nebraska is testing the use of a closed-loop ethanol plant 
(Klopfenstein 2007). An existing feedlot, with a 30,000 head capacity, is the base for the 
experiment; cattle are fed wet distillers grains produced at an adjacent ethanol-plant, and cattle 
manure feeds an anaerobic digester which produces all the natural gas used to power the ethanol 
plant. This closed-loop system, if economically efficient, might become the ultimate model for 
ethanol and livestock production. 
 
Energy and Water 
 
Energy and water are also major inputs in ethanol production. Modern ethanol plants use a 
substantial amount of natural gas: $30.1 million of natural gas for a 100 MGY plant in one year, 
accounting for 14 percent of total costs at mid-2007 cornbelt prices. Water and water treatment 
costs vary tremendously among plants based upon the water source, pre-treatment of water, and 
waste management. $600,000 annually is consistent with Chapter 4, but other studies suggest 
almost $3 million per year (Swenson 2006).  
 
A 100 MGY plant uses more than 300 million gallons of water per year, an amount that can 
strain many watersheds and local waste water processing facilities. Plants able to draw and return 
water to a river often raise less environmental concern than those drawing water from an aquifer. 
Plant construction in the western United States has already complicated local water use (Barrett 
2007). Some water districts in Nebraska are offsetting ethanol plant water use by reducing farmers’ 
water allocation for irrigation or restricting nearby well use. 
 
Waste water treatment also varies considerably in cost and availability. Often the treatment 
infrastructure is provided by the municipality or other local government. Many plant sites require 
significant waste water investments, whose cost may be borne by the community or jointly with the 
plant. Sometimes sufficient water and waste infrastructure is already present. The ethanol plant in 





Transportation infrastructure is vital to the ethanol industry. Vast amounts of corn and 
millions of gallons of ethanol are shipped via truck, train, and barge. Over 35 million bushels of 
corn are delivered annually to a 100 MGY plant. Much of the locally produced corn arrives by 
truck, so highway access is important. The heavy trucks carrying corn to the plant and wet distillers 
grains from the plant can quickly wear down secondary roads. Three quarters of ethanol plants are 
located within ten miles of a major U.S. highway or interstate highway. The majority of counties 
not connected with a major U.S. highway are in northwest Iowa, which has good state highways. 
 
The 100 million gallons of ethanol generally are shipped directly from the plant by rail and 
barge because existing pipelines easily contaminate ethanol and it has a limited shelf-life. Railroad 
access is almost a necessity to market ethanol, and all but one ethanol plant is located on a railroad 
(Figure 9). The exception, a midsize plant in southeast Minnesota, probably trucks ethanol to the 
nearest rail terminal. Transportation costs rise every time the good is transferred or loaded; indeed   13
loading fees can be 5 cents per gallon
5, so using multiple transportation modes adds up quickly. 
Transportation costs are higher if the ethanol plant is not located on a main line railroad, only a 
short line. Additionally, due to the corrosive nature of ethanol, some railroads are requiring the 




Figure 9. Rail Roads and Ethanol Plants 




Marketing firms are important in the industrial organization of ethanol. Transporting ethanol 
is costly and risky, so many ethanol plants contract with a marketing firm to provide transportation 
logistics, market development, and risk management. The marketing firms can play a variety of 
roles. They have direct sales connections to ethanol blenders and bulk storage and transportation 
infrastructure of their own.  
 
Contracts between producers and marketers vary on a case-by-case basis. No practice is 
standard in this industry. Many ethanol plant business plans include a sales and marketing plan to be 
able to attract financing. Ethanol producers sell their product in a variety of manners; some have on-
site pumps and sell an 85 percent ethanol blend, many sell on spot markets, and some have 
contracted out the sale of all their ethanol.  
 
Ethanol production is becoming vertically integrated with marketing, transportation, and 
blending. Ethanol production is competitive and, like all competitive industries, margins are thin 
and risk is high. The industry is experiencing both tremendous growth and rapid change in how the 
product is marketed. For example, Center Oil Company of St. Louis is planning to build a 
moderately sized ethanol plant in southwestern Illinois this year and is already a fairly sizeable 
                                                 
5 We thank Dr. Mike Mazzocco, University of Illinois, for his sharing marketing and transportation information with us.   14
purchaser and blender of ethanol. The president of its ethanol subsidiary stated, “I think it’s a 
natural extension of our business. It provides us some control over a component that we’re going to 
have to purchase anyway with the mandates that were announced last year in the new energy bill. 
(Ortbals 2007).” Center Oil’s decision to integrate and become an ethanol producer may indicate the 
future direction of the ethanol industry. By integrating, Center Oil can reap profits that would go to 
the ethanol producer, marketer, and transporter.  
 
Illinois Ethanol Plants 
 
Seven ethanol plants are operating in Illinois, four are under construction, and many more 
are at various proposal stages. By June 2007, 57 air permit applications for ethanol plants had been 
submitted to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency. The 11 plants in operation or under 
construction mirror the key location characteristics. All are in corn producing counties with cattle 
on feed, and all have rail service (Table 2).  The host counties are diverse, ranging from a rural one 
with 6,000 people to a mixed urban metropolitan one with population 261,000.  
 
Table 2. Illinois Ethanol Plants, August 2007 
















Adkins Energy  Stephenson  Lena  40  Mixed 
Rural  47,388 19.9  12,120  Yes/No 
ADM Macon  Decatur  290  Mixed 
Rural  109,309 21  1,441  Yes/Yes 
Aventine 
Renewable Energy  Tazewell Pekin  207  Mixed 
Rural  130,559 22.3  2,246  Yes/Yes 
Illinois River 
Energy  Ogle Rochelle  50  Mixed 
Rural  54,826 25.7  18,458  Yes/Yes 
ADM Peoria  Peoria  100  Mixed 
Rural  182,495 15.9  1,979  Yes/Yes 
Lincolnland Agri-
Energy  Crawford Palestine  48  Rural  19,825  7.6  273  Yes/No 
MGP Ingredients  Tazewell  Pekin  78  Mixed 
Rural  130,559 22.3  2,246  Yes/Yes 
Plants Under Construction              
Patriot Renewable 
Fuels  Henry Annawan  100  Mixed 
Rural  50,339 36.2  20,645  Yes/Yes 
Central Illinois 
Energy  Fulton Canton  37  Mixed 
Rural  37,378 19.2  3,295  Yes/No 
Marquis Energy  Putnam  Hennepin  100  Rural  6,005  4.5  298  Yes/Yes 
Center Ethanol Co.  St. Clair  Sauget  54  Mixed 
Urban  260,919 18.6  1,435  Yes/Yes 
Data Source: Renewable Fuels Association, August 2007, for plant information.  
Local Economic Effects of an Ethanol Plant 
 
Measuring the local economic effects of an ethanol plant is a painstaking two-step process. 
The first step, scenario building, entails carefully thinking through what happens when a plant 
locates in a county. The scenario includes the plant hiring a labor force and purchasing corn, but 
quickly gets far more complex, involving local agricultural land ownership, substitution among   15
crops, capitalization of corn price premiums into land values and rents, and possibly cattle 
production. The second step, economic modeling, traces the effects of the plant operation and other 
aspects of the scenario on all the sectors of the economy. The challenge is to modify an input-output 
model of the local economy and its basic assumptions so that they reflect reality better and the 
model matches up successfully with the scenario. Both steps, scenario building and economic 
modeling, involve considerable judgment, specifically, an understanding of how the economy 
works, assumptions about key parameters, and estimates for data that are not available. To avoid the 
mysterious black box syndrome and to facilitate future studies by others, those judgments are 
presented in considerable detail here, so they can be discussed and replaced, if possible, with better 
decisions based on either new evidence or more compelling logic.  
 
The Three Study Areas 
 
The scenario and local economic effects are not the same for all places, even with an 
identical plant. The reasons are simple. Places vary in their capacities to increase corn production 
and utilize grain by-products, in local ownership of farmland, and in the ability of the local 
economy to supply the goods and services demanded by the ethanol plants, agricultural producers, 
land owners, and others receiving income directly or indirectly as a result of the ethanol plant 
coming into the county.  
 
Three Illinois counties are explored here, each with a proposed ethanol plant. Their different 
levels of urbanization and the varied sizes of their local economies illustrate how the local effects of 
an ethanol plant depend on local conditions. Kankakee is the northern most, a mixed rural 
metropolitan county, roughly 60 miles south of Chicago, whereas Coles is a mixed rural 
micropolitan county in east central Illinois and Hamilton is a rural county in southern Illinois with 
fewer than 9,000 residents (Table 3, Figure 10).  
 
Table 3. Hypothetical Illinois Ethanol Plants and Study Counties 














Coles 60  Mixed  Rural  50,949 19.2 5,900  Yes/Yes
Hamilton 100  Rural  8,835 8.2 2,700  Yes/No
Kankakee 100  Mixed  Rural 109,090 32.2 6,300  Yes/Yes
      
Data Source: BEA-REIS, NASS Illinois Ag Stats 
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Hypothetical Study Counties









Proposed 100 MGY plant  
adjacent to closed coal mine
Coles county
60 MGY plant due to begin 
construction
Kankakee county
Proposed 100 MGY plant
 
Figure 10. Illinois Ethanol Plants and Study Areas 
Data Source: U.S. Census Tiger, Renewable Fuels Association 
 
Kankakee County is the site of a proposed 100 MGY plant to be operational in 2008. It 
makes an interesting case study because of its proximity to Chicago and the main East-West 
railroad and Interstate 57 and its relatively high land values, but the county is rural enough to 
produce the corn utilized by the plant. Half the existing Illinois ethanol plants are in metropolitan 
counties that are mixed rural in character, like Kankakee.  
 
Coles County is the site of a proposed 60 MGY plant, whose construction is to begin in 
2007 (Stroud 2007). Also a mixed rural county, Coles is micropolitan, not metropolitan, meaning 
that its largest urban area has fewer than 50,000 people. (The precise numbers are 65,073 residents 
for the Kankakee urban area, and 21,200 for the Charleston urban area in Coles County.) 
 
Hamilton County is an unusual ethanol case. It has a proposed 100 MGY plant, despite 
being south of the intensive corn producing area. The site is adjacent to an old coal mine that has 
been converted into a state-of-the-art, operating 1.5 million bushel grain elevator. No other 
abandoned coal silo has been converted into grain storage. The proposed plant would source grain 
from the adjacent elevator. It has an on-site 90-car rail loop and a recently resurfaced road it will 
share with the grain storage facility.  
 
Ethanol Production Assumptions 
 
Ethanol is such a new industry that it is not identified separately in national input-output 
accounts. Closest among the 509 sectors within IMPLAN, the modeling system commonly used in 
studies like this one, is wet corn milling, but modern dry mill plants use different technology than 
the older wet mill plants. Therefore, the scenario building step includes detailed assumptions about   17
ethanol production to create an ethanol industry inside the IMPLAN model. We lean heavily on the 
work of David Swenson (2007) at Iowa State University and chapter 4.  
 
IMPLAN, and input-output models more generally, describe production technologies in 
terms of dollars of each input per dollar of output. A good strategy to describe the dry mill ethanol 
industry in this way is to adjust the model’s closest sector, wet corn milling. Table 4 shows per 
dollar amounts for selected inputs in the wet corn milling sector of Illinois and the amounts 
assumed for the dry mill ethanol industry. Key differences are more corn (part of the grain farming 
sector), natural gas, chemicals, and less electricity and truck transportation. These numbers assume 
corn producers pay to truck the corn to the ethanol plant (and in return receive the per bushel 
premium over market price), and the plant does not pay to transport the ethanol to the buyer.
6 In 
fact, transportation costs depend on the wide array of ethanol marketing decisions adopted by firms 
and on how they treat the spent grains. 
 
Table 4. Key Differences between Wet Corn Mill and Dry Mill Ethanol Plants 
 (Input in Dollars per Dollar Output) 
Input from Sector  Wet  Dry 
Grain Farming  0.18  0.61 
Natural Gas Distribution  0.05  0.14 
Rail Transportation  0.06  0.0 
Other Basic Organic Chemical Manufacturing  0.01  0.05 
Power Generation and Supply  0.04  0.03 
Water-sewage and systems  0.0002  0.003 
Wholesale Trade  0.15  0.01 
Truck Transportation  0.06  0.03 
Oilseed Farming  0.004  0.0 
 
The input-output relationships depend on the prices of both the inputs and ethanol. At mid-
2007 prices, corn represents well over half the input costs for a typical ethanol plant. A few years 
ago, it was one third. When the corn price dropped to $2 per bushel in 2005, ethanol became 
profitable, not just economically feasible, and the low corn prices drove increased ethanol 
production (Doering 2006). Recent corn prices are far higher (Figure 11).  
 
                                                 
6 The price a producer would receive for ethanol if the buyer paid transportation costs from the place of production is 









































Figure 11. Monthly Average Corn Price Received in Illinois and Futures Price 
Data Source: FarmDoc, University of Illinois 
 
The balance among corn prices, ethanol prices, and operating profits is very delicate in 
today’s markets. The ethanol price received by producers varies substantially based upon plant 
location, marketing contract, and transportation/marketing costs. No industry standard practice 
exists for transportation or marketing costs. The closest location to the Illinois plants for which the 
Agricultural Marketing Service provides freight on board (FOB) prices is Des Moines, Iowa. At the 
October 10, 2007, price of $1.43 a gallon (USDA-AMS 2007), a plant with the costs in our scenario 
would have operating losses. Therefore, we use the lowest FOB ethanol price that would allow the 
plant to break-even, $1.80. Ethanol operating profits are sensitive to energy prices on the input cost 
side, too (Table 6). Natural gas and electricity cost 14 cents per dollar of ethanol at mid-2007 prices 
(Table 4). 
 
Table 6. Selected Costs and Revenue (millions of dollars) 
   60 MGY Plant 
100 MGY 
Plant 
Cost of Corn, $3.50 per bushel  79  131 
Cost of Energy  22  36 
Cost of Water and Sewer*  0.3  0.6 
Cost of Chemicals, Enzymes, Yeasts  7  14 
Cost of Rail Transportation**  0  0 
Cost of Labor  2  2 
Revenue from Ethanol, $1.80 per gallon   108  180 
Revenue from Distillers' Grains  21  35 
Total Costs  126  209 
* Water costs are on the low-end here; these costs vary greatly by plant.   
**Rail Transportation costs vary greatly by plant and are assumed to be zero because we assume FOB ethanol price.  19
 
Local Corn and Cattle Production Assumptions 
 
Having estimated that a typical 100 MGY plant will utilize 37.4 million bushels of corn per 
year, at a value of $131 million when corn is $3.50 per bushel, the next question is the source of that 
corn. Local corn production can be expected to increase when a premium-paying ethanol plant 
locates within the area. Depending on local conditions, including the size of the premium relative to 
the transportation costs it defrays, the premium can lead to conversion of other lands into cropland, 
substitution away from other crops into corn, neither, or both. For areas with prime farmland, like 
Kankakee and Coles, most productive agricultural land is already in crops. There a reasonable 
assumption is that cropland acres will remain unchanged in the short term, and any corn increase 
must be offset by a decrease in production of other crops. The usual practice of rotating corn with 
soybeans to prevent pest problems may be postponed, with corn planted in consecutive years.
7 
Conservation Reserve Program land is not a significant short-term option to increase cropland 
because it is under contract with withdrawal penalties. Thus far, attempts to change the rules to 
waive the penalty have not succeeded. For areas with less productive farmland, land in forage crops 
and other uses, including recreation, and vacant land, might be drawn into corn production.  
 
The proposed plants in Coles and Kankakee will be able to draw most of their corn locally, 
but the one in Hamilton will not, which is why it plans to use grain shipped by rail to the adjacent 
1.5 million bushel grain elevator. Table 7 shows the number of bushels needed to operate each plant 
at full capacity and the bushels of corn harvested in its county in 2006. Coles and Kankakee 
counties probably will source all of their corn from within the county, because 90 percent of the 
quantity needed is already produced within the county and the corn premium should result in it 
being sold to the plant. Furthermore, farmers can substitute away from soybeans and grow corn 
following corn. On productive farmland, the added returns to corn will cover the costs of additional 
inputs and decreased yield that makes up for the failure to rotate (Roe and Jolly 2006). 
 
Table 7. Corn Harvest in Home County, Three Case Study Plants 
 
Bushels Harvested for Grain (millions), 
2006 





Coles 60 MGY  19.2  21.4  90% 
Hamilton 100 MGY  8.2  35.7  23% 
Kankakee 100 MGY  32.2  35.7  90% 
Data Source: NASS Illinois Ag Stats, 2006, and appendix. 
 
Teasing out an ethanol plant’s effect on substitution among crops is difficult. Substitution 
depends on relative prices, and relative prices depend on the extent of substitution. Modeling the 
substitution effect requires determining how many acres will be converted and how many dollars 
would result from the output gained in corn and lost in soybeans. Doing that means forecasting 
producer behavior well and trusting the IMPLAN model to reflect accurately what happens in the 
local economy as farmers switch from soybeans to corn.
8  
                                                 
7 One Piatt County producer farms 3000 acres, 98% corn, and claims some of it is fifth year corn!  
8 Input-output models like IMPLAN assume constant returns to scale. They are ill suited to modeling changes at the 
margin that involve substitution in industries with scale economies like corn and soybean production.    20
The substitution of corn for soybeans being observed in 2007 stems primarily from the 
relative changes in corn and soybean prices at the national level. The price changes are being driven 
by overall supply and demand conditions, including the growth in the number of ethanol plants, not 
by any one local ethanol plant. Most of the extra corn will be produced regardless of whether a new 
ethanol plant offering a modest premium is located within the county. 
 
Nevertheless, for illustrative purposes, we shall estimate the effects of certain amounts of 
corn-soybean substitution as if it were caused entirely by the plant. To best assess the net effect of 
substituting corn for soybean production, we calculate the number of acres of corn needed above the 
2006 production levels to meet the proposed plant’s entire demand. We assume farmers will grow 
corn rather than soybeans to satisfy that demand and calculate the dollar output decrease in 
soybeans and dollar increase in corn from converting the necessary acreage. We assume realistically 
that there are no employment changes on the farm from the crop change. 
 
Finally, the local ethanol plants might lead to increased numbers of cattle on feed. Indeed, 
the Renewable Fuels Association (2007) has noted an increase in livestock production near ethanol 
plants, likely due to availability of the relatively inexpensive feed that is a by-product. Given the 
productivity of cropland in Kankakee and Coles, additional cattle are unlikely because the rich 
cropland is more profitable in corn production than in cattle. However, Hamilton County, with a 
below Illinois average corn yield of 140 bushels per acres in 2006, has the possibility of increased 
cattle production. To get a sense of the magnitude of local economic effects, we model a 200 
percent increase in cattle. A full blown study of an integrated ethanol plant and large-scale feedlot 
would require the same kind of attention to detail and research on that new cattle-feeding 
technology as was done here for ethanol. Instead, we simply use the current technology in IMPLAN 
to make a rough estimate.  
 
Farmland Value and Rent Assumptions 
 
The locally caused substitution effect of an ethanol plant, as opposed to those caused by 
ethanol plants collectively, results from the corn price premium. It generates income over and above 
what producers would have received at their local grain elevators, and it becomes capitalized into 
land values. Producers will produce more corn, but land prices and rents will rise. Producers who 
own their farmland profit by keeping the corn premium, and producers who rent farmland face 
higher rents (ISPFMRA 2007). In short, with land as the fixed factor in corn production, the corn 
price premium from proximity to ethanol plants accrues to farmland owners in the forms of higher 
rents. The local premium is pocketed by the producer in the initial period but affects rents and land 
value, for instance, when the next year’s cash rent is negotiated. In the long run, benefits will accrue 
mostly to the land owner rather than the producer.  
 
Fragmentary empirical evidence exists on the increases in farmland values and cash rents 
after an ethanol plant locates locally. The Illinois Society of Professional Farm Managers and Rural 
Appraisers (2007) found a $250 to $500 per acre premium on land values close to ethanol plants in 
northwest Illinois, which translates into a 5 to 10 cent premium per bushel.
9 Ethanol Producer 
Magazine reports a 5 to 10 cent per bushel premium paid on the 2007 corn crop (Schill 2007). 
Apparently no rigorous studies have yet separated the ethanol plant proximity effect from the many 
                                                 
9 Assuming a 3.5 percent rental return rate and 180 bushels per acre   21
other factors increasing farmland values. Generally increases in farmland value caused cash rents to 
rise 10 percent between the 2006 and 2007 growing seasons, and they are projected to increase 
approximately 10 to 20 percent for 2008 (ISPFMRA 2007). The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
(Oppendahl 2007) found that the value of good Illinois farmland increased by 6 percent in 2006 and 
varied regionally, for instance, 17 percent near Chicago and 4 percent in east central Illinois. A 
reasonable baseline estimate is that a new ethanol plant will cause local farmland prices to rise by 
the premium paid to producers. We use 5 cents per bushel, a 1.4 percent increase but also consider 
an alternative high-end scenario with a 10 percent or 35 cents per bushel increase.   
 
The annual additional income to all farmland owners from the premium paid by a local 
ethanol plant can be imputed as the additional rental income if all farmland were cash rented to 
producers. The annual rate of return or cash rents for farmland is 3.5 percent, based on historical 
rates of return (ISPFMRA 2007), so the cash rent premium from proximity to an ethanol plant is 3.5 
percent of the higher land value.  
 
Local Ownership Assumptions 
 
Only a portion of the imputed additional income of farmland owners affects the local 
economy; income of absentee landlords leaves the local community. Again, information is 
fragmentary and incomplete, leaving a wide band of uncertainty (Table 8). ISPFMRA (2007) finds 
55 percent of farmland not owned by the operator. A 2002 Iowa State University survey found that 
45 percent of Iowa farmland owners do not live on the land and 19 percent of Iowa farmland is 
owned by those living out-of-state (Duffy 2004). These estimates suggest that local ownership is 
greater than 45 percent and less than 81 percent. The analysis that follows uses both extremes. 
 
Table 8. Evidence on Percent Local Land Ownership 
Source Finding  Implication 
ISPFMRA 2006  55% IL farmland not owner operated  Local ownership > 45%  
Duffy 2004  19% IA farmland owned out-of-state  Local ownership <81% 
 
The added income of local farmland owners is calculated in a few steps, illustrated here with 
a 1.4 percent land value increase, 3.5 percent of land value as rent, and 45 percent local ownership 
(Table 9). The average land values for each county’s average type of farmland (ISPFMRA 2007) 
multiplied by the acres of cropland forms the starting point. The added income to local landowners 
ranges from $75,700 in Hamilton, where cropland values are lowest per acre, to $331,000 in 
Kankakee, where cropland values per acre and the number of cropland acres are highest. 
 
Table 9. Calculation of Premium to Land Owners Due to Corn Price Premium 
  Coles Kankakee  Hamilton 
Average Land Value per acre(ISPFMRA)  $2,908 $4,500 $1,669
Acres of Cropland(USDA)  238,586 333,821 205,784
Value of Cropland  $693,808,088 $1,502,194,500 $343,453,496
Increase in Land Value (1.4%)  $9,713,313 $21,039,723 $4,808,348
Land Value Increase to Local Owners  
(45% local ownership)  $4,370,990 $9,463,825 $2,163,757
Rental Income Increase from Land Value Increase 




All the scenario deliberations reduce to four ways a new ethanol plant can affect the local 
economy: (1) producing ethanol, which entails purchasing labor and other inputs locally, (2) paying 
a premium for corn, which provides added income for farmland owners, (3) drawing additional land 
into corn production, and (4) increasing cattle production. In IMPLAN modeling language, the 
event being modeled is an increase in ethanol output within the county, an increase in land owners’ 
income, an increase in corn acres, and a decrease in soybean acres to accommodate the substitution 
into corn. Creating the models to measure the effects of the scenarios on the local economy is 
straight forward with the commercially available IMPLAN software and database 
(www.implan.com), but four aspects of corn-based ethanol add some complexity.  
 
First, as noted, the IMPLAN model has no modern dry mill ethanol industry, so we added 
one by modifying the wet mill technology. A gasoline blender is not added to the models because 
we assume all ethanol will be sold to a non-local gasoline blender. We also assume the ethanol plant 
is not locally owned because most of the newest plants are not (Swenson and Eathington 2006).  
 
Second, input-output models are demand-driven; they assume that when demand exists, 
supply will be forthcoming. At the extreme, the models imply that local producers will respond to 
the demand from the new ethanol plant and, hence, produce another 37.4 million bushels of corn. A 
common mistake when calculating the economic effects of a new ethanol plant is to treat all the 
local corn used by the plant as new output; corn that would have been produced locally anyway is 
not part of the local economic impact of the plant. To avoid this problem, we set the regional 
purchase coefficient for corn in the model to zero, thus, preventing the ethanol plant’s corn demand 
being transformed into new corn production within the county.
10  
 
Third, cornbelt counties are already close to their short term capacities for corn and soybean 
production, and corn will be grown regardless of whether the purchaser will be a grain elevator or a 
new local ethanol plant. The ethanol plant should not be credited for the employment and income 
resulting from existing corn output in the county or from switches between corn and soybeans that 
are driven by general market prices. The relevant change is any resulting from the local corn price 
premium offered by the plant to attract the corn away from other uses.  
 
Given interest in the effect of corn-soybean substitution and ignoring this fundamental issue 
of untangling general and local price causality, we estimate the local economic effects of corn-
soybean substitution. To illustrate, we calculate the number of acres that must be planted in corn 
using 2006 average yield per acre, so that total production in the county equals all the corn needed 
by its new plant. Average prices permit estimating the value of the decrease in soybean output and 
the increase in corn output. Per worker output values are manipulated within the model, so that the 
net employment effect of switching from soybeans to corn production on the farm is close to zero.
11  
                                                 
10 The regional purchase coefficient measures the proportion of demand that can be satisfied by the local economy. 
11 Input-output models like IMPLAN assume constant returns to scale. They are ill suited to modeling changes at the 
margin that involve substitution in industries with scale economies like corn and soybean production. Thus we have to 
modify the constant returns assumptions for the model to represent real employment decisions as a result of the 
corn/soybean substation.   23
Hamilton County does not have enough acres to produce the corn needed for its proposed plant due 
to relatively low yields and a terrain less suitable for row crops; there we put all tillable land into 
corn production, leaving the remaining corn to be imported. 
 
Table 10. Estimated County Change in Corn Output and Soybean Output  
 Hamilton Kankakee  Coles 
2006 Corn Acres Harvested  58,700  73,400  114,000 
Additional Corn Acres Needed and Feasible  90,000*  43,500  20,000 
Value of Additional Corn Output ($ millions)  43.9  25.5  11.7 
Value of Decrease in Soybeans  ($ millions)  18.4  33.1  9.1 
Data Source: 2006 Illinois Ag Stats, NASS, USDA 
*Over 209,000 acres are needed, more than Hamilton County can provide. Analysis is limited to a feasible 
  number of additional corn acres. 
 
Fourth, we model the local effects of the corn premium as income to land owners, or 
proprietor’s income in IMPLAN modeling language. It could be modeled as additional household 
income, but proprietor’s income seems better because farmland owners are more likely to reinvest 
the income in their farms than treat it as additional household income (Swenson 2007).  
 
A few more decisions merit brief mention. The geographic area for each model is the county 
of the proposed plant, not the full drawing area of the plant’s labor force and other inputs. Using 
larger areas would lead to larger economic effects because more inputs could be sourced within the 
larger area. Construction period effects of the plant are not considered, in part because they are 
short lived and most ethanol plant construction is performed by industry specialists from outside the 
area. The price of corn does not enter the model explicitly but is an important factor in estimating 






The prototypical 100 MGY ethanol plant itself generates $203 million in sales and employs 
39 full-time equivalent workers, creating $2.4 million in wages (appendix). The smaller, 60 MGY 
plant generates $121 million in sales and employs 35 full-time equivalent employees. These are the 
direct local effects of the plants on output and employment. In addition, indirect effects result from 
the local purchases of goods and services by the plant, as well as the local purchases of goods and 
services by the local firms that supply the plant. Furthermore, there are induced effects from the 
consumption expenditures by employees of the plant, its suppliers, and their suppliers.  
 
At full capacity, considering the direct, indirect, and induced effects, the proposed plants 
would generate 153 jobs in Hamilton County, 152 in Coles, and 248 in Kankakee (Table 11). The 
largest economic impacts are in Kankakee, which has the most complex economy and a large plant. 
More generally, job creation is lower the more rural the county, a typical finding in impact studies, 
because more multiplier effects happen locally when more goods and services are available locally.  
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Table 11. Economic Effects of Ethanol Plant Operation 
   Hamilton, 100MGY     Coles, 60MGY     Kankakee, 100MGY 
  Rural  Mixed Rural Micropolitan Mixed Rural Metropolitan
  Total Output  Employment Total Output Employment Total Output  Employment
   (millions)    (millions)    (millions)   
Direct 214.6  39  128.8  35  214.6  39 
Indirect  14.6  97.1 15.4  82.7 27.2  152.1 
Induced  1.6  16.7 3.0  34.6 5.7  59.1 
Total 230.8  152.7    147.2  152.2    247.6  250.1 
Data Source: IMPLAN regional input-output economic impact estimator, 2006 data 
 
The results for the three study areas illustrate how important local conditions are in 
determining the indirect and induced effects of an ethanol plant. An identical plant leads to 100 
more jobs in Kankakee than in Hamilton, which has a population of only 8,000 and a far smaller 
local economy. Likewise, the 60 MGY plant in Coles has the same total employment effect than the 
100 MGY Hamilton plant because Coles has a more complex economy. In output terms, the 
Hamilton economy grows more than the Coles economy and almost as much as the Kankakee 
economy, but solely because plant output is the dominant output changes. 
 
To create a better understanding of how the effects occur within an economy, Table 12 
shows the employment effects for the sectors most affected in Kankakee County.  
 
Table 12. Employment Effects of Ethanol Plant Operation, Kankakee 
Sector Direct  Indirect  Induced  Total 
Sum of all sectors  39  152  59  250 
Truck Transportation  0  57  0  57 
Dry mill ethanol  39  0  0  39 
Natural Gas Distribution  0  14  0  14 
Food Services and Drinking Places  0  5  7  12 
Wholesale Trade  0  10  2  12 
Other State and Local Gov’t   0  7  0  7 
Civic-Social-Professional Organization  0  4  1  5 
Automotive Repair and Maintenance  0  4  1  5 
Monetary Authorities and Depositories  0  3  1  4 
Hospital 0  0  4  4 




Compared to plant operations or corn production, the land rent changes resulting from the 
corn premium have relatively small effects. With the 1.4 percent land value increase and 45 percent 
local land ownership rate, Hamilton’s added rental income of $75,700 creates a fifth of a job, Cole’s 
$153,000 yields 1 job, and Kankakee’s $331,000 generates 2.2 jobs (Table 13).  
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Table 13. Economic Effects of Ethanol Plant Corn Price Premium, 
1.4% land value increase, 45% local land ownership 
   Hamilton 100MGY    Coles 60MGY    Kankakee 100MGY 
  Total Output Employment Total Output Employment Total Output  Employment
   (thousands)    (thousands)    (thousands)   
Direct 75.7 0.2  153.0 0.7  331.2  1.6 
Indirect 1.5  0  9.3  0.1  25.8  0.2 
Induced 1.1  0  10.9  0.1  33.6  0.3 
Total 78.3  0.2 173.2  1.0  390.7 2.2 
 
Since the farmland rent and ownership assumptions are based on such fragmentary 
information, sensitivity analysis is worthwhile. Table 14 shows the imputed rental increases under 
several assumptions. The highest, a 10 percent rent increase with 80 percent local ownership, 
generates 12.7 times as much imputed local rental income as the far more likely 1.4%, 45% 
scenario. Given the proportional nature of input-output models, 12.7 times more income produces 
12.7 times more local effect. The 10%, 80% assumptions bring the local economic effects of the 
corn premium to 28 jobs in Kankakee, 12 in Coles, and 3 in Hamilton (Table 15). The two middle 
options would produce effects 1.8 and 7.1 times those shown in Table 13.  
 
Table 14. Rental Income Increases, Alternative Assumptions 
Assumptions Hamilton  Coles  Kankakee 
1.4% land value increase, 45% local land ownership  $75,731  $152,985 $331,234 
1.4% land value increase, 80% local land ownership  $134,634  $271,973  $588,860 
10% land value increase, 45% local land ownership $540,939  $1,092,748 $2,365,956 
10% land value increase, 80% local land ownership $961,670  $1,942,663 $4,206,145 
 
Table 15. Economic Effects of Ethanol Plant Corn Price Premium, 
10% land value increase, 80% local land ownership 
   Hamilton, 100MGY     Coles, 60MGY     Kankakee, 100MGY 
  Rural    Mixed Rural Micropolitan  Mixed Rural Metropolitan 
  Total Output  Employment    Total Output Employment Total Output  Employment
   (millions)      (millions)    (millions)   
Direct 1.0  2.4    1.9  9.2  4.2  20.1 
Indirect 0.02  0.2  0.1  1.4  0.3  3.1 
Induced 0.01  0.2    0.1  1.6  0.4  4.4 
Total 1.0  2.7    2.2  12.2  5.0  27.6 
 
The decision to treat these rents as proprietor income rather than household income makes a 
small difference. Modeling the extreme case as additional income to households with incomes of 
$75,000 to $100,000 yields a total output of $5.1 million with 36 jobs in Kankakee, instead of the 
$5.0 million and 28 jobs when modeling it as proprietor income.  
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Corn-Soybean Substitution 
 
  Conversion of 43,500 acres to corn in Kankakee, 20,000 in Coles, and 90,000 in Hamilton 
(Table 10) results in a net increase in farming output because corn has a higher value than soybeans. 
Table 16 shows the estimated change in output and the economic impact of substituting what would 
normally be acres of soybeans for acres of corn.  
 
Table 16. Estimated Economic Impact of Switching Soybean Acres to Corn Acres to Meet 
Plant Demand 
  Hamilton 100MGY    Coles 60MGY    Kankakee 100MGY 
  Total Output  Employment  Total Output  Employment  Total Output  Employment 
Direct  10.8 0.1  4.0 0.1  5.6 0.7 
Indirect  1.4 13.2  0.7  10.1  3 22.6 
Induced  0.03 0.3  0.3 3.2  0.5 4.7 
Total  12.3 13.6  3.0 13.2  9  28.0 
 
The effects vary among the counties because of differences in acreage, yields, and the local 
economies. Kankakee again has the largest indirect and induced effects because its local economy is 
able to provide more goods and services. Hamilton has the largest direct output effect largely 
because the most acreage is converted there. The negligible direct employment effects reflect the 





We assumed Hamilton County’s cattle industry would triple in size from 3,000 to 9,000 
head, a small amount compared to the 100,000 cattle that the plant’s by-products could feed at any 
one time. Since no integrated feedlot is planned, and it takes time to breed cattle and create the 
infrastructure to raise, process, and transport extra cattle, this tripling of production is reasonable for 
the first few years and serves to illustrate a cattle scenario. Recall that modeling a large, integrated 
feedlot should involve changing the cattle production coefficients in the model. Using the existing 
sector, the scenario implies an extra $5.4 million in cattle sector output and an extra 37.8 jobs in the 
cattle sector. Eighteen indirect jobs result, including 8.5 in cattle production, including raising 
calves, 3 in forage production, 2 in real estate, and 1 in veterinarian services. In all, tripling the 




The dominant effect on the local economy in terms of job creation is from the operation of 
the ethanol plant. In the four case studies, there are 35 to 39 jobs at the plant and 99 to 250 after all 
the indirect and induced effects in the county are included. Increases in cattle operations, where 
feasible, could have large effects, but the effects depend on the technology to be used, its integration 
with the local economy, and its labor intensiveness. The effects of the corn price premium are small, 
whether through rent increases, land values, or crop substitution.  
Comparing results to other studies is a useful check of any impact study, but the 
opportunities for comparison are limited here. Most reports are vague about their assumptions and   27
utilize the wrong industry sector, treating ethanol plants as wet corn milling instead of creating a dry 
mill industry (e.g., Petersan, 2002 and Pierce et al., 2006). In a report for the Renewable Fuels 
Association, Urbanchuk (2008) estimates a 100 MGY ethanol plant will lead to 1,137 jobs in the 
local economy and 1,790 jobs statewide. That local impact is four times the 250 jobs found here for 
Kankakee and eight times the 153 jobs for Hamilton (table 7). Noting that the size of the impact will 
depend on the “the amount of inputs that will be sourced locally,” Urbanchuk makes some 
simplifying assumptions, e.g., half of the corn will procured from farmers within 100 miles, and his 
results are not for any particular area or state. The choice of areas does not explain the big 
difference between his numbers, which are widely distributed by the Renewable Fuels Association, 
and the numbers here. Modeling the statewide effect of a 100 MGY plant in Illinois in the same way 
as for the four counties, again without the corn premium and cattle effects, yields 581 jobs, far 
fewer than the 1,790 reported by Urbanchuk. Since Illinois ought to have larger impacts, not smaller 
impacts, than a prototypical state because of the size and complexity of the Illinois economy, the 
differences in the studies are not caused by the choice of places. 
The more modest results here are similar to those of Swenson (2008). His 50 MGY plant for 
regions of Iowa leads to $133.5 million total output and 133 jobs, proportionately comparable to the 
economic impact of the 60 MGY Coles County plant, $147.2 million output and 152 jobs from the 
plant operations (without corn premium and cattle effects). Likewise, his 100 MGY plant leads to 
$254 million output and 170 jobs, more jobs than the same size plant in rural Hamilton but fewer 
than in metropolitan Kankakee, and output almost the same as in Kankakee (table 7).  
The differences among studies stem chiefly from the assumptions made in the scenarios. 
Any study that considers the corn production and the corn producers an impact of the plant will 
yield far larger numbers than one that assumes correctly that most of the corn would have been 
grown anyway. Urbanchuk’s method includes the effects of growing corn, which Swenson (2007) 
estimates accounts for 18, 398 jobs of the 27,205 that Urbanchuk attributes to ethanol in Iowa. The 
core assumption built into the input-output model, constant returns to scale or everything is 
proportional, is particularly bad for ethanol. It is a heavy user of water, natural gas, and electricity, 
utilities that are the textbook example of industries with decreasing, not constant, costs to scale. 
Based on interviews with industry professionals, Swenson (2007) takes another 1,943 jobs away 
from Urbanchuk’s Iowa total because the utilities do not add jobs proportionately to their output 
increases. Swenson chips away further: 1,081 jobs stemming from transportation because the corn 
would have been transported to export without the ethanol plant and 351 jobs from petroleum 
refining unlikely to occur in Iowa. In the end, changing the assumptions reduced the estimated Iowa 
job impact from 27,205 to 5,431.  
Thus, assumptions matter, a lot. Understanding an industry, and how the various parts of its 
supply chain respond to demand changes, and understanding the assumptions made in regional 
input-output modeling are essential when conducting an economic impact analysis. The world is not 
as simple as the demand-driven, fixed proportions input-output model. With more detail than 
possible in this paper, the series of reports, Swenson (2006, 2007, 2008) and Swenson and 
Eathington (2006), illustrates beautifully what must be done to conduct a well-informed industry 




An ethanol plant offers the same enticing benefits to the local economy as any 
manufacturing plant that employs 30 to 50 people and pays good wages. Local economic   28
development in many places is aimed at attracting such enterprises because they provide jobs and a 
local tax base, increase demand for housing and land, and provide customers for local businesses. A 
common danger is that the manufacturing plants and other establishments that can be attracted to an 
area often are the very ones that can be re-attracted elsewhere when conditions change to favor 
another location, for example, because of free trade agreements or lower wages. In contrast to 
typical “footloose” industries and branch plants, ethanol production is tied to local advantages and 
resources—the corn, the railroad, the water and energy, and the proximity to markets. Rooted in the 
local economy in this fashion, ethanol production offers more security than many other industrial 
employers. 
The security of ethanol jobs is undermined for other reasons, however. The industry’s long-
term, and even mid-term, evolution is uncertain. There are dark storm clouds on the horizon. 
Various doomsday scenarios are easy to conjure up, each of which would put particular ethanol 
plants at risk. Corn might be replaced by other feed stocks, which might change the relative 
advantages of Cornbelt locations.
i The energy and corn price balance could squeeze profits so that 
only plants with a particular technology and facing relatively low energy and feedstock prices 
would survive. The protective policy umbrella might develop some holes. Other cheaper, 
oxygenates might be created. The scale of the industry might continue to evolve toward larger 
plants, more efficient technologies, and vertically integrated companies, and the industry could 
consolidate, driving out many of today’s ethanol plants like the local meat processing plants of yore. 
Plants might change ownership repeatedly, as new owners try to cut costs and become profitable. 
The good jobs and tax base, the very benefits that made the ethanol plant desirable for local 
economic development, may erode as the plant provides fewer good jobs and asks for tax credits 
and other fiscal incentives to remain in business. At the end, which may be only a few years away, a 
community may be left with only a vacant plant and unpaid bonds for new water, energy, and 
transportation infrastructure. Ethanol will be the latest on the list of robust heartland industries that 
have disappeared. Indeed, in the past months the plans for plants in Kankakee and Coles have been 
dropped, and the Harlan and Hamilton plans are at a standstill. Location factors suggested these 
were good sites, but the economics of the industry and the currently high corn prices and relatively 
low ethanol prices make the business too risky right now. 
Another, better story of ethanol and local economic development can be told. The storm 
clouds dissipate. Energy prices and new industrial and agricultural technologies combine to make 
ethanol a sustainable industry in the Cornbelt (or for whatever crop the belt is known in the ethanol 
age). In that case, the ethanol plant is a long-term part of the local economy—not a magic change 
agent that hires hundreds and allows high school graduates to stay in the area, but a contributor of 
good jobs, a local market for value added agricultural production, a good corporate citizen, and one 
of the anchors of the local economy.  
Under these long-term conditions, the local economic development concern is not the plant’s 
industrial survival but the nature of the terms under which it locates there. Ethanol production 
requires large quantities of water and energy and puts a considerable burden on the road system. 
The water demand alone is controversial in areas where residents worry about depleting aquifers, 
and any project that generates a lot of truck traffic also brings out local opposition. The fiscal 
impacts and the plant’s balance of costs and revenues merit careful consideration. In the flurry of 
inter-county competition for ethanol plants and amidst the enthusiasm for adding jobs, stimulating 
economic activity, and supporting value-added agriculture, local decision makers forgetting to tote 
up the local benefits and costs is understandable, but could be a serious mistake.   29
The number of jobs created or other measures of economic activity depend on the size of the 
plant, complexity of the local economy, what goods and services are available locally, and how 
much income is generated locally by the corn price premium. The ethanol plant leads to 250 jobs 
under the most favorable assumptions for job creation in the most complex economy with the 
highest farmland values. In all, these numbers mean an ethanol plant is a contributor not a panacea 
for a county, more like a corn chip manufacturer than an automobile plant. Its economic 
contributions are small enough to merit a careful look at the demands a plant would place on local 
services, infrastructure, and resources and to recognize the uncertainties that surround the ethanol 
industry and the viability of a particular plant. 
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Appendix. The Hypothetical Ethanol Plant 
Table A summarizes the production, input, and revenue assumptions used throughout this 
study to characterize a modern 100 MGY ethanol plant. Table A is based upon the same data used 
in Chapter 4 of this volume and is comparable to data collected by David Swenson, Department of 
Economics, Iowa State University. Swenson’s data are based on interviews and information he 
received from industry and biological science experts. The major difference is the cost of water and 
water treatment and this may be because water availability and disposal varies plant-to-plant. The 
numbers represent a typical dry mill ethanol plant. Ethanol input technology and corn, energy, and 
ethanol prices are highly volatile and vary over time and space, but these data provide a plausible 
snapshot of such prices and input combinations. We use Swenson’s methodology to scale the 100 
MGY plant inputs to a 60 MGY plant.  
 
To estimate local economic effects, we assume the plant operates at full capacity with a 
conversion rate of 2.8 gallons of ethanol per bushel. Some analysts use a higher conversion rate, but 
the 2.8 rate was reported to Swenson by organic chemists he interviewed in 2006. We assume corn 
is $3.50 per bushel to be congruent with analysis in other chapters of this larger study. Corn, 
ethanol, and energy prices are representative of autumn-2007 levels.  
 
Fall 2007 FOB ethanol prices predict a loss for the ethanol plant. This illustrates how 
volatile corn and energy prices make ethanol a risky business. We have increased the FOB price by 
close to 50 cents per gallon of ethanol, so that the plant breaks even for our analysis. Should federal 
subsidies to the ethanol purchaser were reduced from current levels, the ethanol price and plant 
revenues would likely drop. In short, the short-term profitability or losses of an ethanol plant at any 
give time are highly dependent upon technology, prices, and public policy that affects both input 
and ethanol prices.   33
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Table A: Costs and Revenues of a Hypothetical 100 MGY Ethanol Plant 
 
Production Assumptions  Baseline Ranges  
Rated capacity (gal per year)                       100,000,000 20 to 100 million   
Nameplate factor  100% 90% to 120%   
Denatured Alcohol (gal per bushel)  2.8 2.5 to 2.9   
DDGS yield (lb per bushel)                          18 15 to 22   
CO2 yield (lb per bushel)                             7.7 15 to 22   
        
Primary Inputs  Baseline Input Costs Prices / cost  Unit/Basis 
Corn (bu)               37,428,571                      131,000,000 3.5  Bushel 
KwH Electricity               75,000,000                         6,000,000 0.08  KwH 
Natural Gas (btu* bu*alc. yield)             3,353,600,000,000                       30,182,400 9  Million BTU 
Other Inputs      
Enzymes                            5,432,832 0.145  Bushel 
Yeasts                           2,490,048 0.067  Bushel 
Chemicals: processing and antibiotics                         2,263,680                   0.06  Bushel 
Chemicals: boiling and cooling                               679,104 0.018  Bushel 
Denaturants                           4,094,835 0.109  Bushel 
Water                              600,000 0.017  Bushel 
     Real estate tax, licenses, admin                           2,000,000  
     Unspecified costs                            7,857,143                       0.22  Bushel 
All interest costs (average of 1st 5 years)                         8,875,951                 0.089  Bushel 
All other unspecified                           7,857,143 0.22  Bushel 
Labor        
FTE 39      
Average Wage and Benefits  $62,500       
Total labor and management  $2,437,500       
Total Costs   $209,482,601   
        
   Production Income Price Received Unit 
Denatured alcohol (gal)             100,000,000                     180,000,000 1.8  Gallon 
DDGS (tons)                    346,500                       34,650,000 100  Ton 
CO2 (tons)  145,000 -  0  Ton 
Total Revenue   $214,650,000   
 
                                                 
i Epplin et al. (2007) envision a centrally managed and coordinated, vertically integrated cellulosic feedstock production 
and delivery system based on a low-cost perennial such as switchgrass. They cite one study positing that 55 million 
acres of cropland, idle cropland, and cropland pasture could be seeded in a perennial energy crop and another 
concluding that 100 million acres could be devoted to switchgrass with some economic incentives.  